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[N.B. Since the publication of this paper, Heidegger’s notes for the winter semester 
1930–31 seminar on Plato’s Parmenides have been published in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 
83: Seminare: Platon—Aristoteles—Augustinus, ed. Mark Michalski (Frankfurt am 
Main: Klostermann, 2012), 23–37. However, the Gesamtausgabe edition does not 
incorporate the transcript of seminar notes in the Herbert Marcuse Archive discussed 
in this paper, and does not even mention its existence; the editor even conjectures 
that the announced continuation of the seminar in the summer semester of 1931, 
documented in the transcript, did not take place (see Mark Michalski, editor’s 
epilogue, GA 83, 667–68). Apparently, no authorized student protocol of the seminar 
was made, probably due to the unofficial and “private” character of the seminar.]  
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Abstract: The paper will study an unpublished 1930–31 seminar in which Heidegger 
reads Plato’s Parmenides, showing that in spite of his much-criticized habit of dismissing 
Plato as the progenitor of “idealist” metaphysics, Heidegger was quite aware of the 
radical potential of his later dialogues. Through a temporal account of the notion of 
oneness (to hen), the Parmenides attempts to reconcile the plurality of beings with the unity 
of Being. In Heidegger’s reading, the dialogue culminates in the notion of the “instant” (to 
exaiphnēs, Augenblick) in which the temporal plurality of presence and un-presence 
converges into a unified disclosure.  
 
 
There is a standard objection to Heidegger’s version of the destinal history (Geschichte) 
of Western metaphysics from its “first inception” (der erste Anfang) in Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, and Parmenides up to its “completion” (Vollendung) in Hegel, Marx, and 
Nietzsche. This objection concerns the role given, in this history, to Plato. 
The later Heidegger’s remarks on Plato present him as the founder of metaphysics 
proper, as the “first end of the first beginning” of Occidental thinking.1 By this 
Heidegger means that whereas the Presocratic thinkers already prefigured Western 
metaphysics in thinking emergence-into-Being, physis, in terms of pure and positive 
presence, they still had a strong experience of the event-character of this presence, of 
presence as “presencing” (Anwesung), as expressed by Parmenides’ founding words: esti 
gar einai, “for Being is taking place.”2 Plato, however, loses sight of this fundamentally 
temporal event-character of reality and approaches Being from the viewpoint of ideally 
accomplished present-ness and accessibility, ousia. The model of present-ness or being-
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ness is basically, for Plato, the ideal and essential whatness of a thing’s presence—its 
form or “look” (idea, eidos)—which precisely in its ideality is more present and accessible 
than the concrete reality of incomplete, temporal, and changing particular things.3 This 
ideal of perfect beingness has since haunted Western metaphysics up to what Nietzsche 
calls his “inverted Platonism.”4 
The possibility of experiencing Being as a dynamic, ongoing, and finite event of 
taking-place (Ereignis)—within the temporal place or context of meaningfulness 
furnished by human being (Dasein)—has thus been definitely suppressed and 
supplanted by the static ideal of supra-temporal beingness. As Heidegger argues in the 
two lecture courses entitled “On the Essence of Truth” from 1931–32 and 1933–34 and in 
the essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (1940), in Plato’s allegory of the cave, the initial 
experience of truth as alētheia, as having-emerged from concealment, is reformulated as 
and restricted to orthotēs, correctness (Richtigkeit), i.e., the correct directedness of 
thinking to the ideal—ultimately, to the idea tou agathou, the Idea of the Good, the source 
of meaningfulness for all other Ideas.5 
While this radical ontological reading of Plato has profoundly influenced 
“continental” Plato scholarship, many of Heidegger’s own pupils and colleagues—
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Jaspers, in particular—were struck by its obvious one-
sidedness.6 This is definitely not the whole truth about Plato. Heidegger seems to 
deliberately disregard many dimensions of Platonic thought, thus violently reducing 
Plato’s ontological potential in order to fit him neatly into his own grand metaphysical 
narrative. He also seems strangely insensitive to the subtleties of the dialogue form and 
makes many disparaging remarks about the dialectical method as such.7 As is the case 
with Aristotle’s critique of Plato, most of Heidegger’s remarks seem, in fact, to apply to 
a dogmatic form of Platonism rather than to Plato’s own thought in its complexity, 
ambiguity, plurivocity, and playfulness. As Heidegger himself admitted to his pupil 
Georg Picht, in the end, Plato eluded him:  
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Shortly after the war, we took a walk in the forest above his [Heidegger’s] house. I got up 
my courage and tried to explain to him why his interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the 
cave did not convince me. This was a central point, because his entire interpretation of 
European metaphysics relied on it. . . . After posing, with restrained passion, a number of 
apt, exact questions, which I did not evade, he stood still and said, “I must say one thing 
to you: the structure of Platonic thinking is completely unclear to me.”8 
  
As Gadamer has pointed out, especially the dialogues that are considered to have 
been composed by Plato late in his life seem, in fact, to offer ample resources for the 
radical overcoming (Überwindung) of metaphysics that Heidegger was working on.9 In 
his later works, Plato himself indeed seems to “overcome” his own earlier “doctrine” of 
Ideas. Ever since the publication of Heidegger’s 1924–25 lecture course on the Sophist, 
we have known that Heidegger was quite aware of the radical developments in the later 
Plato—even though he here suggests that these developments could be attributed to the 
growing influence, within Plato’s Academy, of the young Aristotle.10 In the Sophist, 
Being (to on) is fundamentally understood as the mediating possibility (dynamis) of the 
mutual interaction or complicity (koinōnia) between the dialectically opposed supreme 
kinds (megista genē) of Being—namely, becoming (kinēsis) and static presence (stasis), 
sameness (tauton) and otherness (heteron), in general, Being and Un-being (to mē on), or 
presence and un-presence.11 
There is, however, another later dialogue that is closely connected to the themes of 
the Sophist and has given interpreters even more trouble: the Parmenides. This extremely 
intense and compact dialectical investigation is considered by many to be the most 
demanding work ever written by Plato. It is therefore striking that in his published 
lectures and writings, Heidegger almost never so much as mentions this dialogue.12 In a 
letter to Heidegger in 1949, Jaspers points out this omission:  
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If the second half of his [Plato’s] Parmenides would be performed anew with today’s 
methods (and not Neoplatonically), then all bad metaphysics would be overcome, and the 
space would be open for a pure hearing of the language of Being.13 
 
There is no record of a reply from Heidegger to Jaspers’ remark. It seems almost as 
though the Parmenides was for him something like a taboo. Nevertheless, we know from 
the course catalogue published in William Richardson’s Heidegger: Through 
Phenomenology to Thought (1963) that during the winter semester of 1930–31 Heidegger 
did give a seminar entitled “Plato’s Parmenides.”14 A transcript of notes from this 
unpublished seminar is available at the Herbert Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt.15 Even 
though the transcript only comprises 24 pages, it gives us a good idea of the rich and 
intense character of Heidegger’s reading of the dialogue. I can here highlight only some 
of the central features and conclusions of this reading. 
The seminar on the Parmenides was supposed to be a joint seminar, co-directed by 
Heidegger and the younger classics scholar Wolfgang Schadewaldt (1900–1974), who 
later became quite famous within his discipline. What Schadewaldt’s actual role in the 
seminar was is unclear; the style and content conveyed by the transcript are, in any 
case, unmistakably Heideggerian.16 On the basis of Heidegger’s systematic, if not very 
detailed and somewhat inconclusive reading, let us briefly look into the basic setting, 
structure and point of the Parmenides. 
The setting of the Parmenides is a very indirectly narrated and obviously fictitious 
encounter, situated in an almost mythical past, between the young Socrates and two 
philosophers from Elea in Italy, old Parmenides and his younger accomplice Zeno, who 
have supposedly come to Athens to celebrate the Greater Panathenaic festival. A 
youngster by the name of Aristotle is also present; it is obviously tempting to take this 
as an allusion to Plato’s famous pupil.17 
The central theme of the dialogue is the Eleatic thesis of the unity of Being and its 
implications. In the opening sequence, Zeno is reading aloud a treatise where he argues 
that reality cannot really be many or manifold, as this would lead to absurdities. 
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Socrates here mocks Zeno: Zeno has in fact given many arguments in order to show that 
reality is not manifold. What Socrates implicitly calls into question is whether or not 
Zeno, in saying that reality is not manifold, is really saying the same as his revered 
teacher Parmenides, who famously teaches that reality is one and unified.18 Socrates 
then proceeds to state the main problem of the dialogue. It can easily be shown that the 
same thing can be both one and many in what Aristotle would call the “accidental” (kata 
symbebēkos) sense. For example, I am many—I participate in the Idea of plurality—in the 
sense that I have many parts, a front side and a back side, hands and legs, etc. I am also 
one—oneness is present in me—in the sense that I am one of the many people that are 
present in this room. However, there is no essential connection here—plurality and 
unity just both happen to be present in me.19 What Socrates would like to know, and 
what he sees as a most demanding task to demonstrate, is whether or not there is an 
essential and radical connection between the One and the Many—whether oneness as 
such presupposes plurality and vice versa. “Yet I will indeed be astonished if [someone] 
will demonstrate that what as such is one [ho estin hen] is itself many, and that, 
accordingly, the many are indeed one.”20 
From here, Parmenides himself takes over. Parmenides is presented as a much 
more profound thinker than his pupil Zeno. The entire dialogue seems to imply that 
Plato’s main aim in the Parmenides and in the Sophist is by no means to refute 
Parmenides, but rather to reappropriate Parmenides’ thesis of unity on a more radical 
and fundamental level than his Eleatic followers, Zeno and Melissus, had done.21 In the 
dialogue Theaetetus, for instance, referring back to the Parmenides, the old Socrates 
refuses to discuss Parmenides with the other Eleatics, as he recalls having been so 
forcefully struck by the profundity of this thinker in his youth.22 It is, in fact, quite 
possible that the reading of the Parmenides decisively modified Heidegger’s own 
understanding of Parmenides and of the Presocratics. Whereas in the 1920s he tends to 
see Plato and Aristotle as being ontologically more original than Parmenides with his 
static conception of immobile Being,23 the later Heidegger stresses the role of 
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Parmenides as a genuinely pre-metaphysical, “inceptual” (anfänglich) thinker of the 
event of Being.24 It must be noted that Heidegger gave his first major lecture course on 
Anaximander and Parmenides, entitled “The Inception of Occidental Metaphysics,” in 
1932, shortly after the seminar on Plato’s Parmenides.25 
In the dialogue, Parmenides takes up Socrates’ question concerning the essential 
connection between the One and the Many, and transforms it into a critical re-
examination of Socrates’ early views on the Ideas. Parmenides certainly seems to think 
that the young philosopher is off to a good start. Yet he points out that Socrates’ 
understanding of the relationship that he calls “participation” or, more literally, 
“mutual involvement” (methexis), between the one Idea and the plurality of concrete 
individual things, is rather vague.26 Parmenides here takes up what is famously known 
as the Third Man Argument. If we assume, like the young Socrates, that the unifying 
Idea or Form—for example, being-human as such—is an entity independent of and 
separate from the individual, concrete humans, then the only way to account for their 
mutual relationship is to posit a wider context, a third being-human, that comprises and 
brings together both the primary Idea and the individual beings. This, of course, leads 
to an infinite regress.27 Nor, however, can we simply deny, in a nominalistic fashion, 
that there is a stable, permanent, and unifying human essence apart from the plurality 
of individual humans, for then all our discourse concerning humanity or being-human 
as such would be devoid of any stable meaning.28 The notion of the “involvement” of 
the many things in the one and single Idea thus remains obscure; in fact, it seems to 
turn out to be an “empty poetic metaphor,” as Aristotle puts it in the Metaphysics.29 
An endless amount of literature on the Third Man Argument and its validity 
exists. In a Heideggerian reading, however, its main thrust is clear: if the Being of 
beings is conceived of on the same level with beings—if, in other words, the ontological 
difference between Being and beings is not taken into account in a radical way—then no 
sense can be made of their mutual relationship.30 
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With this problem, Parmenides has the young Socrates cornered; obviously 
Socrates has not taken it into account. Along with certain other Plato scholars, 
Heidegger seems to think that in posing the question concerning the relationship 
between the many beings and their unifying Being anew in this manner, Plato reaches a 
more radical formulation of the question of Being than is attained in his early and 
middle dialogues, such as the Phaedo, which gives the classical version of the doctrine of 
Ideas.31 The Parmenides demonstrates the aging Plato’s startling ability to make a new 
philosophical beginning.32 The main theme of the dialogue—the question of a possible 
essential connection between the Many and the One—is for Heidegger at once the 
question concerning the relation of beings, which are many, to Being, which is one. 
Unlike most interpreters, Heidegger actually finds in the dialogue a positive solution, or 
at least a profound indication of a solution, to this problem.33 What makes the dialogue 
Parmenides uniquely radical is the fact that this solution explicitly involves temporality. 
Parmenides and Zeno now advice Socrates that the only path ahead in this 
difficult problem is an exercise (gymnasia) in dialectic, more precisely, in the 
hypothetical form of investigation that examines the necessary consequences of certain 
hypotheses as well as their negations—for, as Zeno points out, “Without such a 
thorough passage and wandering through all [relevant things] it is impossible for the 
mind to attain the truth.”34 After several requests from those present, Parmenides 
himself finally agrees to perform such a dialectical exercise with the young Aristotle as 
his partner, even though he emphasizes how extremely strenuous this exercise will be.35 
The elaborate and painstaking passage through several hypotheses—basically of the 
form “the One is”—and some of their contraries—basically, “the One is not”—
constitutes the long second part of the Parmenides. Many interpreters have seen the 
second part as completely detached from the first one—some take it to be a mere 
sample exercise in Plato’s late dialectic, without much relevance for the general theme 
of the dialogue.36 It has even been suspected of being a sophisticated joke.37 For 
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Heidegger, however, the second part is not only intimately connected to and consistent 
with the first one, but in fact he takes it as proposing a solution to the initial problem.38 
The first hypothesis, “the One is” (137c4–142a8), leads to an impasse. Parmenides 
shows that the One, considered as an absolute unity, that is, as a unity that excludes all 
plurality and otherness, is in fact an impossible notion. Absolute unity is something of 
which nothing can be said or thought, as all discourse and predication necessarily 
involves plurality and difference. Absolute unity has no attributes at all. Taken as 
absolute, unity cannot even be said to be or to participate in beingness (metechein 
ousias)—it can be characterized only in negative terms.39 The Neoplatonic interpreters of 
Plato, Plotinus, and Proclus among them, took the first hypothesis to be the proper 
culmination of the dialogue; here, Plato would point to the absolute, unspeakable, and 
incomprehensible One, the fundamental source that is itself “beyond Being” (epekeina 
tou ontos) and from which all secondary reality emanates.40 This ineffable unity is the 
cornerstone of the elaborate Neoplatonic metaphysics of late antiquity. 
The extensive second hypothesis (142b1–155e3), however, presents a different 
notion of unity: a unity that does participate in beingness, and is therefore not absolute 
unity, but One and Many. Here Parmenides attains a remarkable insight: since we can 
say of such a unity that it is, it must be temporal, as “is” is the present tense of the verb 
“to be” and thus refers to present time.41 If the unity of Being is not to be absolutely 
detached from the plurality of beings, it must have an essential relationship to the 
temporality and manifoldness of the givenness of these beings. 
The third hypothesis (155e4–157b5), which is auxiliary to the second one and deals 
specifically with the question of the temporality of the One, is for Heidegger the 
culmination of the dialogue Parmenides. He refers to it as the “core of the entire 
dialogue,” even as the “utmost point that Plato attained in a positive way.”42 The first 
semester of the seminar ends abruptly with Heidegger’s blunt and astounding remark:  
 
The third passage of the Parmenides is the most profound point to which Occidental 
metaphysics has ever advanced. It is the most radical advance into the problem of Being 
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and time—an advance which afterwards was not caught up with [aufgefangen] but instead 
intercepted [abgefangen] (by Aristotle).43  
 
What Heidegger is saying here seems to contradict practically everything else he 
ever said about Plato and Aristotle. Fortunately, according to the transcript, the seminar 
was continued into the summer semester of 1931. Here, Heidegger has the opportunity 
to elaborate a bit. By comparing the third hypothesis of the Parmenides to Aristotle’s 
treatise on time in the fourth book of the Physics, he shows in what sense Plato’s account 
of the temporal unity of Being makes Plato’s views on temporality more radical than 
those of Aristotle.44 However, in his lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta, also from 
the summer semester of 1931, he seems to partially take back this strong statement: 
 
Plato attained the insight that Non-being, the false, the bad, the transitory—hence 
Unbeing [Unseiende]—also is. . . . If, however, ever since ancient times Being is one (hen), 
then this intrusion of notness [Nichthaftes] into the unity signifies its folding out into 
multiplicity. Thereby, however, the Many (the manifold) are no longer simply shut out 
from the One, the simple; rather, both are recognized as belonging together. . . . Whether 
Aristotle’s pollachōs [the manifold meaning of Being] represents only a continuation of 
Plato’s later teachings that the One is many (hen—polla), or whether, conversely, the 
Platonic hen—polla represents the still-viable Platonic form of coming to grips with the 
already awakened Aristotelian pollachōs by the elder Plato, will probably never be 
decided.45 
 
Heidegger also argues that the account of the temporal unity of plurality formulated in 
the Parmenides is even more radical than the solution to the question of Un-being 
attained in the Sophist46; this is all the more surprising, considering that the Parmenides is 
generally considered to have been composed before the Sophist.47 To conclude, we will 
take a brief and sketchy look at the temporal account given in the Parmenides.  
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If, as Parmenides proposes, the unity of Being is not absolute but rather relative 
and temporal, then it must be unity in relation to plurality, static presence in relation to 
becoming, identity in relation to otherness—on the whole, temporal presence in relation 
to temporal absence, being-present in relation to not-yet-being and to not-being-
anymore. But then the true unified nature of reality can be established only if there is 
some kind of mediation between these opposites, between presence and absence. There 
must be a point of view on reality where reality is neither simply present nor simply 
absent—neither simply now nor simply not-yet or not-anymore. This point of view 
cannot be the temporal “now,” if this is conceived simply as the present part of time. 
Therefore Parmenides comes up with a concept of presence which is neither presence 
nor absence, neither becoming nor static, but relative to both—namely, the transition, 
mediation, or “overturning” (metabolē) between these fundamental pairs of opposites 
that constitute reality. This kind of presence he calls the instant, the “all-of-a-sudden” 
(to exaiphnēs).  
 
For the “instant” [to exaiphnēs] seems to indicate precisely something out of which 
transition [metabolē] takes place into either direction [that is, becoming or static presence]. . 
. . Precisely this odd, instant kind of reality [physis] is posed in between becoming [kinēsis] 
and static presence [stasis]. Itself it is not within any time; what is in the state of becoming 
passes over into it and out from it into static presence, and what is static passes on to 
becoming.48 
 
Heidegger is one of the few interpreters to lay great weight on this notion of the 
instant, and apart from Hegel49 and Kierkegaard he is perhaps the only one to find here 
the solution to the entire problematic of the dialogue and a peak within Plato’s thinking 
as a whole. Kierkegaard, in The Concept of Anxiety (1844), sees the “instant” of Plato’s 
Parmenides as radically prefiguring the Christian experience of the paradoxical 
mediation between the immanence of temporality and the transcendence of eternity in 
the incarnation of Christ, and derives thence his own concept of the “instant” or of the 
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“glance of the eye” (Danish Øieblikket, German Augenblick).50 Although Heidegger does 
not mention Kierkegaard here, he also translates to exaiphnēs with Augenblick—a concept 
that plays a central part in the analysis of temporality in Being and Time. It must be 
noted that in his lectures from 1929–30, Heidegger makes the following enigmatic 
remark: 
 
What we here designate as the “instant” [Augenblick] is what was really comprehended for 
the first time in philosophy by Kierkegaard—a comprehending with which the possibility of 
a completely new epoch of philosophy has begun for the first time since antiquity.51 
  
Plato’s “instant” is that peculiar kind of unified presence which mediates between 
simple presence and simple absence, between simple static Being and becoming, 
between identity and otherness, between the One and the Many. The instant is presence 
as temporal, as one-and-many, as Heraclitus’s hen diapheron heautō, the One 
differentiating from itself—as presence-by-absence, to use Thomas Sheehan’s apt 
expression52, or, in Derridean terms, as différance. Time, for the Greeks, was the opposite 
of unity, self-identity, and presence—insofar as reality is temporal, it is also scattered, 
manifold, and ecstatic. The instant is the temporal presence where the ecstases of time—
the already or the no-longer, the not-yet as well as the here and now—are folded 
together. It is the unified presence of reality as temporally scattered and manifold. 
Unlike the temporal “now,” understood as a point in time, the “instant” is not in 
time—it is not “temporal” in the ordinary sense. However, in Heidegger’s reading, the 
“instant” is not within time, but rather manifests the essence of the temporality of Being 
as such: “As to the exaiphnēs, we say it is time itself. Time is not eternity, but rather the 
instant [Augenblick].”53 And Heidegger sums up the third passage even more bluntly: 
“Being is metabolē [transition / overturning], metabolē is exaiphnēs [instant].”54 
We do not have the opportunity here to study the latter part of the dialogue, 
consisting of six shorter hypotheses that draw the intricate consequences from this 
radical notion of unity. The main point of these last hypotheses is that if there is unity, if 
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reality is one, then this unity of reality both comprises all things and is no thing.55 If 
there is no unity, if reality is not unified, then there is no manifold reality at all but only 
nothing.56 Heidegger interprets: Being itself, insofar as it unifies reality and renders 
beings possible, is itself no being at all, but rather intimately characterized by 
nothingness [Nichtigkeit].57 As we already know from Heidegger: Being is the Nothing 
[Nichts], the background which makes the Something possible in the first place.58 The 
dialogue Parmenides concludes with these astounding words of Parmenides: 
 
Let this therefore be said, and let us also say the following, as it seems appropriate. 
Whether or not there is a unity, the unity itself and the manifold otherness, both in 
relation to themselves as well as to each other—all this, in every way, both is and is not, 
appears [phainetai] and does not appear. —This is most true [alēthestata].59     
 
The concluding word is the character Aristotle’s grandiose alēthestata: “This is most 
true.” The most profound articulation of reality as one-in-many, as identity-in-
differentiation, as presence-by-absence, has been attained. Heidegger concludes his 
seminar with the following words: 
 
Maximal truth has been attained when appearance and Non-being have been included 
within truth and Being. The dialogue literally leads to Nothing [Nichts]. . . . Thereby the 
question of Being has been transformed, everything is now otherwise. The on is both hen 
and polla, and it is hen, insofar as it is polla and vice versa. The One and the Many are only 
insofar as they are in themselves negative [nichtig].60 
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